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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a great deal of variation in levels of violent crime across 
communities of different colors in urban neighborhoods throughout the 
United States.  This variation is seen in rates of violence that are much 
higher in predominantly minority neighborhoods, especially those 
comprised of blacks, compared to predominantly white neighborhoods.1  
This Article addresses the question of how to account for stark 
differences in criminal violence across communities of varying colors.  
We draw on arguments set forth by race and ethnic scholars in the social 
sciences who contend that the social organization of U.S. society is 
structured to produce and reinforce a racial order where whites are 
privileged over other groups.2  This racialized order is evident in 
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 1. See, e.g., Robert D. Crutchfield et al., Race, Labor Markets, and Neighborhood Violence, in 
THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME: INEQUALITIES OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA 199, 
199 (Ruth D. Peterson et al. eds., 2006) (suggesting neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
minorities have higher rates of violence); Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a 
Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37, 37 (John Hagan & 
Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995); Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged 
Neighborhoods and Urban Crime, 75 SOC. FORCES 619, 620 (1996) (explaining racial differences in 
crime in poor neighborhoods); Thomas L. McNulty, Assessing the Race-Violence Relationship at the 
Macro Level: The Assumption of Racial Invariance and the Problem of Restricted Distributions, 39 
CRIMINOLOGY 467, 467–68 (2001) (explaining racial differences in rates of violence). 
 2. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Bobo, Inequalities That Endure? Racial Ideology, American 
Politics, and the Peculiar Role of the Social Sciences, in THE CHANGING TERRAIN OF RACE AND 
ETHNICITY 13, 26–31 (Maria Krysan & Amanda E. Lewis eds., 2004) (“Laissez-faire racism 
involves . . . resistance to meaningful policy efforts to ameliorate U.S. racist social conditions and 
institutions.”); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND 
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 8–11 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter 
RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS]; EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE 
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contemporary society but has roots in historical patterns that are 
connected with slavery and Jim Crow.  From this point of view, the 
historically rooted systemic racial structure is reflected in inequality in a 
variety of arenas, one of which is neighborhood violence. 
Here, we seek to explore how racialized structural patterns undergird 
the highly inequitable rates of criminal violence evident across 
communities of distinct colors—a pattern that reflects the striking white 
privilege of being able to live in dramatically safer neighborhoods than 
all other groups of color.  Taking this perspective shows how differential 
patterns of violence across ethnoracial groups are products of structural 
relations of society rather than stemming from individual differences in 
propensities to engage in violent behavior.  We, therefore, expose the 
ways in which historically-based structural relations must be front and 
center in understanding contemporary ethnoracial inequality in the 
United States. 
Our discussion proceeds in four parts.  First, we explain in greater 
detail our conceptual framework for understanding inequality in rates of 
violence.  This is a two-part discussion in which we focus on (1) the 
theory of a racialized social structure and (2) why violence stems from 
such a structural organization.  Second, we describe the nature of the data 
and methods employed to examine the proposed relationships.  
Importantly, we use unique data on neighborhood criminal violence that 
allows for exploration of patterns for a representative set of large cities 
throughout the United States.  Previous research on this topic has been 
limited to analyses of areas within a single or a few cities.  Third, we 
present descriptive findings regarding community differences in 
neighborhood social conditions and violence.  These results make clear 
the extent to which ethnoracial groups live in divergent social worlds.  
This is followed by multivariate findings on the net contributions of 
particular neighborhood social conditions to differences in violent crime 
across neighborhoods of distinct colors.  Finally, we draw conclusions 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 12 (2001) [hereinafter BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY]; Manning 
Marable, The Political and Theoretical Contexts of the Changing Racial Terrain, in THE CHANGING 
TERRAIN OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, supra, at 224, 225–33 (“The disproportionate wealth that most 
white Americans enjoy today was first constructed from centuries of unpaid black labor.”); 
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S 
TO THE 1990S 79 (2d ed. 1994) (“The major institutions and social relationships of U.S. society . . . 
have been structured from the beginning by the racial order.”).  See generally JOE R. FEAGIN, 
RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 137–74 (2000) (“White 
prerogatives stem from the fact that society has, from the beginning, been structured in terms of 
white gains and white-group interests.”). 
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regarding the implications of a racialized structure for violent crime, and 
for approaches to reducing or eradicating ethnoracial inequality in 
patterns of violence. 
II. RACIALLY STRUCTURED SOCIETY 
A central idea articulated by many race scholars in the social 
sciences and legal literature is that race is a central organizing principle 
within and across societies.3  In the United States, this means that society 
is patterned in such a way as to reproduce and sustain the privileges of 
whites over other groups, and to position blacks at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy.4  The social positions of other ethnoracial groups are 
often considered to fall between these two extremes.  Recently, Bonilla-
Silva and Glover have proposed that the racial order is tripartite, with 
whites at the top of the hierarchy, blacks at the bottom, and a set of 
others including light-skinned Latinos, Asian Americans, Middle Eastern 
Americans, and multiracial individuals structurally in the middle as 
honorary whites.5  According to this organization, blacks include a broad 
set of very dark-skinned groups.6  This perspective suggests growing 
complexity in the nature of racial stratification in the United States.  
Although there are on-going discussions and evaluations of the specific 
merits of Bonilla-Silva and Glover’s tri-racial perspective, scholars 
appear to agree that the racial order in the United States is heavily 
defined by the extremes of white privilege and black oppression.7 
Whatever the specific positions of different groups, all of the 
institutions that comprise a racialized social system are organized to 
maintain a hierarchy of white privilege and minority oppression.8  
Schools, the labor market, politics, and the health care system provide 
opportunities that are systematically differentiated across populations of 
color.9  Specifically, the dominant white population has greater access to 
                                                          
 3. In this paper, we draw on a structural race approach discussed by sociologists and other 
social scientists.  For an overview of critical race theory as discussed among legal scholars, see 
generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(2001). 
 4. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 5. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & Karen S. Glover, “We Are All Americans”: The Latin 
Americanization of Race Relations in the United States, in THE CHANGING TERRAIN OF RACE AND 
ETHNICITY, supra note 2, at 150–51. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, 5 RACE AND SOCIETY (2002) (where a number of 
scholars assess the merits of Bonilla-Silva’s tri-racial perspective with responses by Bonilla-Silva). 
 8. See generally BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 94–103. 
 9. See generally 1–2 AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (Neil 
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high quality institutional resources.10  This includes disproportionate 
opportunities to attend the best schools, obtain prestigious jobs, gain 
political representation, and utilize the highest quality doctors and 
hospitals.11  As a result, whites typically accrue the greatest rewards from 
institutional resources, e.g., higher income, more education, better health, 
and greater wealth.12  Superior opportunities and rewards take on a life of 
their own in furthering the privileges of whites.  That is, whites’ 
accumulated advantages facilitate their ability to maintain superior 
positioning throughout society.  For example, access to communities 
with the best public elementary schools and high schools not only 
improves access to college, along with all of the opportunities flowing 
from high educational attainment, but also increases home values, and 
hence the wealth of residents.13  Wealth can, in turn, help finance college 
and other investments that facilitate continued returns.14  In contrast, 
non-whites, and particularly blacks, experience significantly lower life 
chances in institutional arenas.  This includes a greater likelihood of poor 
quality education, low prestige jobs with associated low income, and 
residence in heavily impoverished communities with low home values 
and weak potential to accumulate wealth.15 
The above arguments do not deny variation in achievement within 
racial groups; nor do they call into question evidence of upward mobility 
and growth in the middle class among blacks and other groups of color.16  
Indeed, after the civil rights movement and related legislation, the 
number of middle class blacks grew at least into the 1970s.17  However, 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
J. Smelser et al. eds., 2001) (compiling data on racial disparity trends in health care, education, 
justice, and income). 
 10. See generally id. 
 11. See generally id. 
 12. See generally id. (concluding that the trends in racialized social systems create benefits to 
the controlling group). 
 13. See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A 
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 11–13, 84–87 (10th ed. 2006).  See generally THOMAS 
M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES 
INEQUALITY 2–18, 155–82 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 55–81 (1999); SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 155–82. 
 15. See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at xi, 2–3. 
 16. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC STAGNATION OF THE BLACK 
MIDDLE CLASS 1, 7–8 (2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/122805_ 
BlackAmericaStagnation.pdf; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 23–24; JESSIE SMITH & 
CARRELL HORTON, STATISTICAL RECORD OF BLACK AMERICA (4th ed. 1997).  See generally MARY 
E. PATTILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES (1999). 
 17. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 9; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 
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the circumstances of families and individuals in the black middle class 
are considerably more precarious; they are concentrated in lower middle 
class occupations and have less wealth and other economic resources on 
which to fall back.18 
To maintain the type of racial system described in broad sweep 
above, specific structures must be in place within and across institutions.  
In the United States, residential segregation and the organization of the 
housing market that supports continued segregation is a key mechanism 
undergirding the existing hierarchy.19  The long history of housing 
market discrimination by race and place created and reinforced 
ethnoracial segregation.20  Historical policies and practices, including 
restrictive covenants and Federal Housing Administration/Veteran’s 
Administration lending policies (e.g., redlining, minimum unit and lot 
standards), supported the development of white neighborhoods and 
suburban localities.21  Real estate blockbusting ensured that inner city 
neighborhoods rapidly turned from white to black.22 
Although these types of practices are now illegal, discriminatory 
actions that help to maintain segregated residential patterns persist.  
Factors that underlie continued segregation include: blacks and others 
receiving less information than whites about available housing; non-
white and white renters and homebuyers being steered to neighborhoods 
with racial compositions that reflect their own race/ethnicity; and 
persistent discrimination in mortgage lending (e.g., higher rates of 
interest, loan denials, and subprime loans for blacks more so than 
whites).23  Lower levels of housing appreciation in black and Latino than 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
13, at 23–24. 
 18. See generally KARYN R. LACY, BLUE-CHIP BLACK: RACE, CLASS, AND STATUS IN THE 
NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 21–50 (2007). 
 19. See, e.g., BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 95–96; DOUGLAS S. 
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS 83–114 (1993). 
 20. See, e.g., KEVIN FOX GOTHAM, RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE, 1900–2000, at 33–47 (2002); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 26–
42; Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 167, 167–68 (2003); Stephen L. Ross & Margery Austin Turner, Housing Discrimination in 
Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes Between 1989 and 2000, 52 SOC. PROBLEMS 152, 153–
55 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., GOTHAM, supra note 20, at 37, 57. 
 22. See id. at 25; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 37–38. 
 23. JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 31 (1995); see, e.g., STEPHEN ROSS & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF 
CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING 5–8 (2002) 
(“[M]ortgage loan applications from black and Hispanic households are still much more likely to be 
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white neighborhoods24 also decrease the housing wealth accumulation of 
groups of color and limit the ability of such groups to move to white 
areas where housing is more valuable.  Segregation is further supported 
by white racist attitudes.25  Whites are highly resistant to living in 
neighborhoods with many black residents and also seek to avoid living 
with many Hispanics and Asians, although to a lesser degree.26 
The results of these practices are dramatic levels of residential 
separation of whites from blacks.27  The most commonly used measure 
of black-white residential segregation shows that in 2000, an average of 
65.2% of metropolitan blacks (or whites) would have to move to a 
different neighborhood to achieve an even residential distribution.28  This 
reflects steady but slight declines in black-white segregation since 
1970.29  The largest decreases in segregation have been in metropolitan 
areas with small black populations where the potential for whites having 
contact with blacks is modest.30  Residential segregation of whites from 
Hispanics and Asians is more moderate, but remained essentially stable 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
denied than applications from whites.”); Carolyn Bond & Richard Williams, Residential Segregation 
and the Transformation of Home Mortgage Lending, 86 SOC. FORCES 671, 677–80 (2007) (“[L]oans 
with less favorable terms and higher foreclosure rates may also have less impact, or even a negative 
impact, in integrating neighborhoods”); Ross & Turner, supra note 20, at 176–77 (“[S]teering by 
real estate agents limits the options of minority home seekers and can perpetuate the currently high 
levels of racial segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Chenoa Flippen, Unequal Returns to Housing Investments? A Study of Real 
Housing Appreciation Among Black, White, and Hispanic Households, 82 SOC. FORCES 1523, 1523, 
1525–27, 1544 (2004) (“[H]igh levels of neighborhood minority concentration undermine housing 
appreciation.”). 
 25. See, e.g., CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY CHARLES, WON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR?: RACE, CLASS, 
AND RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES 163–89 (2006) (“Whites continue to adhere to negative racial 
stereotypes, particularly toward blacks and Latinos, but to a lesser extent towards Asians as well.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 20, at 185–91 (discussing prejudice as the reason for racially 
segregated neighborhoods versus alternative explanations); CHARLES, supra note 25, at 137–40 
(“Whites’ Neighborhood Racial Composition Preferences”). 
 27. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 2 (“No group in the history of the United 
States has ever experienced the sustained high levels of residential segregation that has been 
imposed on blacks in large American cities for the past fifty years.”); John R. Logan et al., 
Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY, Feb. 2004, 
at 1–2 (“[B]lacks faced a near-apartheid situation” in the 1970–1980 decade that “declined 
modestly . . . after 1980.”); Rima Wilkes & John Iceland, Hypersegregation in the Twenty-First 
Century, 41 DEMOGRAPHY, Feb. 2004, at 23. 
 28. Logan et al., supra note 27, at 6 (Table 1). 
 29. Claude S. Fischer et al., Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of 
U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 41 DEMOGRAPHY, Feb. 2004, at 47; see Logan et al., supra note 27, 
at 1 (“Would black-white segregation continue the slow decline that had begun by 1970 . . . ?”). 
 30. See, e.g., Lauren J. Krivo & Robert L. Kaufman, How Low Can It Go? Declining Black-
White Segregation in a Multiethnic Context, 36 DEMOGRAPHY, Feb. 1999, at 94; Logan et al., supra 
note 27, at 2. 
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from 1980 to 2000 due to the continuous flow of in-migrants into 
existing immigrant and ethnic communities.31 
Residential segregation of ethnoracial groups from each other is 
highly consequential because separate is still not equal.32  The 
neighborhoods in which people live provide them with access (or the 
lack thereof) to a wide range of important social and institutional 
resources.  For example, school attendance is generally connected to 
one’s neighborhood location,33 and schools vary widely in their physical 
and academic quality in ways that are closely connected to the economic 
and racial composition of neighborhoods.34  Political representation and 
government services depend on residential location and the distribution 
of local services including street lights, trash collection, police service, 
libraries, and the like, are highly inequitably distributed across 
neighborhoods and municipalities.35  Wealth accumulation is also linked 
with residential location because housing equity is the single largest 
source of wealth for households.36  Home values and housing 
appreciation (major contributors to housing wealth) are influenced by the 
racial composition of the neighborhood, with housing wealth 
accumulating more slowly in heavily black and Latino neighborhoods.37  
Furthermore, within a racially structured society, a range of 
organizations such as businesses and lending agencies make decisions 
about where to invest institutional and economic resources partially 
based upon the racial composition of neighborhoods.  Predominantly 
white areas often receive more economic and social investments that are 
                                                          
 31. See, e.g., Logan et al., supra note 27, at 1 (“Increases in Hispanic and Asian segregation in 
individual metropolitan areas were counterbalanced by a net movement of these two groups towards 
areas of lower segregation.  These increases were associated especially with the more rapid growth 
in the Hispanic and Asian populations.”). 
 32. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 13–14. 
 33. See generally Andrew Grant-Thomas & john a. powell, Structural Racism and Color Lines 
in the United States, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COLOR LINES: MULTIRACIAL CHANGE IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 118 (Andrew Grant-Thomas & Gary Orfield eds., 2009). 
 34. Dennis J. Condron & Vincent J. Roscigno, Disparities Within: Unequal Spending and 
Achievement in an Urban School District, 76 SOC. OF EDUC. 18, 33 (2003). 
 35. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Introduction: The Significance of Race and Place, in THE 
BLACK METROPOLIS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS OF PLACE 1, 2–
4 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2007); Robert D. Bullard, Introduction: Anatomy of Sprawl, in SPRAWL 
CITY: RACE, POLITICS, AND PLANNING IN ATLANTA 2–4 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 2000). 
 36. See, e.g., ALFRED O. GOTTSCHALCK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., SERIES 
P-70-115, NET WORTH AND THE ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLDS, CURRENT POPULATION REP., 
HOUSEHOLD ECON. STUD. 4 (2008); SANDRA LUCKETT, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF COM., SERIES P-70-75, DID YOU KNOW? HOMES ACCOUNT FOR 44 PERCENT OF ALL WEALTH: 
FINDINGS FROM THE SIPP, CURRENT POPULATION REP., HOUSEHOLD ECON. STUD. 2 (2001); 
Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in the Size Distribution of Wealth, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 137 
(1998). 
 37. See, e.g., Flippen, supra note 24, at 1535. 
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also of higher value while communities of color are more likely 
neglected and/or targeted for disinvestments and placement of disruptive 
institutions.38 
Massey and Denton have argued and shown that residential 
segregation serves to channel the racial inequality in rewards (e.g., high 
income) and disadvantages (e.g., poverty) evident in a racially stratified 
society into distinct neighborhood environments.39  Large racial and 
ethnic differences in income and poverty that emanate from the labor 
market, for example, produce large differences in the economic status of 
white, black, and other neighborhoods of color under conditions of 
residential segregation.40  In particular, segregation concentrates white 
economic (and other) advantages within white neighborhoods.41  
Conversely, black areas are mired in multiple disadvantages because 
segregation concentrates the higher levels of black poverty, joblessness, 
and the like within predominantly black neighborhoods.42  Given more 
modest segregation, levels of disadvantage in other neighborhoods of 
color reflect the position of such groups in the social hierarchy—most 
often between that of blacks and whites.43 
III. VIOLENT CRIME IN A RACIALLY STRUCTURED SOCIETY 
How do the racialized neighborhood patterns that are supported 
through segregation connect with ethnoracial differences in levels of 
violent crime?  Perspectives on neighborhood crime contend that local 
conditions produce social environments that encourage (or discourage) 
                                                          
 38. See, e.g., ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN 
CHICAGO, 1940–1960 (1983); DEBORAH WALLACE & RODRICK WALLACE, A PLAGUE ON YOUR 
HOUSES: HOW NEW YORK WAS BURNED DOWN AND NATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH CRUMBLED 9–10 
(1998); Steven R. Holloway & Elvin K. Wyly, “The Color of Money” Expanded: Geographically 
Contingent Mortgage Lending in Atlanta, 12 J. HOUSING RES. 55, 58–60 (2001); Elvin K. Wyly & 
Steven R. Holloway, “The Color of Money” Revisited: Racial Lending Patterns in Atlanta’s 
Neighborhoods, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 555, 557–58 (1999). 
 39. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19. 
 40. See, e.g., PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE 
AMERICAN CITY 3 (1997); Lauren J. Krivo et al., Race, Segregation, and the Concentration of 
Disadvantage: 1980–1990, 45 SOC. PROBLEMS 61, 62 (1998); Douglas S. Massey & Mary J. 
Fischer, How Segregation Concentrates Poverty, 23 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 670, 671 (2000); 
Douglas S. Massey & Mitchell L. Eggers, The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the 
Concentration of Poverty, 1970–1980, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1153, 1168–69 (1990); cf. Lincoln Quillian, 
The Decline of Male Employment in Low-Income Black Neighborhoods, 1950–1990, 32 SOC. SCI. 
RES. 220, 244–46 (2003). 
 41. See Massey & Fischer, supra note 40, at 671; Quillian, supra note 40, at 244–46. 
 42. See sources cited supra note 41. 
 43. See generally Massey & Fischer, supra note 40, at 687–89. 
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and control (or fail to control) violence.44  A common argument is that 
violence is heightened in neighborhoods that are highly disadvantaged 
and residentially unstable because the processes that encourage criminal 
behavior are particularly prevalent.45  Further, the mechanisms of social 
control that normally serve to discourage violent crime are especially 
lacking because it is difficult for communities to organize to promote 
common goals and facilitate the control of violence.46 
Elaborating on processes that encourage crime, residents of 
disadvantaged and unstable neighborhoods may be socialized to engage 
in violence through modeling the actions of others.47  They witness more 
violent acts and have a greater number of “role models who do not 
restrain their” own anger and frustration.48  As a result, violence is a 
more common aspect of everyday life.  Residents must adapt to the 
heightened possibility of violent encounters, which encourages further 
violence.49  That is, community members must use, or appear ready to 
use, violence “to defend their lives and property.”50  As more people 
“adopt defensive and threatening postures” and behaviors such as 
carrying weapons, “the level of violence escalates” and the number of 
people who rely upon violence for defensive purposes increases.51  Role 
modeling and adaptation processes may be particularly potent in 
disadvantaged communities because of widespread joblessness and 
irregular employment.  Thus, many who reside in these neighborhoods 
                                                          
 44. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE 
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 9–11 (1999) [hereinafter ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET]; 
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR at xiii 
(1996) [hereinafter WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS]; Ruth D. Peterson et al., Segregation and 
Race/Ethnic Inequality in Crime: New Directions, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF 
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 169, 169 (Cullen et al. eds., 2006); Robert J. Sampson et al., 
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 
(1997); Sampson & Wilson, supra note 1, at 38.  See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: 
RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1990) [hereinafter ANDERSON, 
STREETWISE]; CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN 
AREAS (rev. ed. 1969); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, 
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) [hereinafter WILSON, TRULY DISADVANTAGED]; 
Christopher R. Browning et al., The Paradox of Social Organization: Networks, Collective Efficacy, 
and Violent Crime in Urban Neighborhoods, 83 SOC. FORCES 503 (2004). 
 45. See, e.g., ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET, supra note 44, at 9–11; WILSON, WHEN WORK 
DISAPPEARS, supra note 44, at xiii; Krivo & Peterson, supra note 1, at 621; Peterson et al., supra 
note 44, at 175; Sampson & Wilson, supra note 1, at 38.  See generally ANDERSON, STREETWISE; 
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 44. 
 46. Peterson et al., supra note 44, at 175. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 176. 
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“are idle for large parts of the day.”52  Idle individuals may “spend 
significant amounts of time in settings where non-conventional role 
modeling and defensive posturing are prevalent—local taverns, pool 
halls and street corners.”53  Thus, “they are involved in ‘situations of 
company’” that may be “conducive” to violence.54 
It is also more difficult to maintain effective social control because 
disadvantaged and unstable neighborhoods are characterized by a high 
degree of social isolation from mainstream society.55  As such, residents 
have less exposure to conventional role models and are less likely to 
have jobs.  There are fewer “old heads” that provide anti-crime, anti-
trouble lessons, and those that remain no longer have prestige and 
credibility as role models.56  Disadvantaged neighborhoods also have 
relatively few working- and middle-class families to serve as social 
buffers cushioning the effects of uneven and poor economic conditions.57  
“This impedes the ability of communities to sustain basic institutional 
structures” and various sources of social control.58  Similarly, residential 
instability is thought to inhibit the emergence of viable social networks 
and to weaken attachments to local communities.59  This hinders efforts 
to mobilize local residents to provide informal social control of 
neighborhood life.60  Diminished social control may also result from 
“inadequate police protection, i.e., insufficient supply and deployment of 
police, failure to respond to calls from residents, or slow and irregular 
responses by the police.  As a result, the costs associated with engaging 
in . . . violence are lessened and the possible deterrent effect of the law is 
reduced.”61  In short, residents of disadvantaged and unstable 
communities lack adequate financial, social, and institutional resources 
to effectively prevent and fight violent crime.62 
 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 170. 
 56. Id. at 175. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.; see also Ruth D. Peterson et al., Disadvantage and Neighborhood Violent Crime: Do 
Local Institutions Matter?, 37 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 31, 32 (2000) (“Disadvantaged 
neighborhoods have difficulty attracting and maintaining the types of local institutions that impede 
violent behavior by providing community stability, social control, and alternative activities to 
occupy the time of residents.”). 
 59. Peterson et al., supra note 44, at 175. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: 
THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL 4–5 (1993)). 
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As noted above, outside agents respond in distinct ways to varying 
communities of color.  External investors favor white neighborhoods and 
tend to neglect black and other non-white areas.  Substantial external 
investments help neighborhoods, while their absence creates sizable 
challenges for the physical appearance and economic viability of 
community structures.63  Neighborhoods in which the infusion of 
resources, e.g., loans to purchase and maintain residential properties, is 
relatively lacking have difficulty repairing dilapidated housing, recruiting 
new home buyers, sustaining existing businesses, and attracting new 
businesses.  As a result, physical deterioration and disorder are enhanced, 
both of which have been linked to violence.64  Further, limited outside 
investments may increase criminogenic conditions such as diminished 
local economic opportunities, weakened local social ties, and 
deteriorated community institutions like schools and churches.65  By 
contrast, substantial outside investments signal the presence of powerful 
political and economic connections that allow communities to fight 
potential threats that could lead to violence.66 
A final neighborhood condition that is relevant for violence and that 
varies substantially across ethnoracially distinct neighborhoods is the 
prevalence of immigrants.  Historically, social disorganization theory 
contended that large immigrant populations contribute to crime and 
violence through the same mechanisms as disadvantage and residential 
instability.67  The presence of large numbers of immigrants was 
considered to undermine social control by making it difficult for 
                                                          
 63. See sources cited supra note 44. 
 64. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN 
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 2–3 (1990); see GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING 
BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19 (1996); cf. 
RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR, AND DECLINE 6–23 (2001); Robert J. 
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look 
at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 605 (1999) (applying a different method 
“to the study of social and physical disorder in urban neighborhoods . . . as an alternative to the 
‛broken windows’ interpretation of the disorder-crime link”). 
 65. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 64. 
 66. See generally María B. Vélez, The Role of Public Social Control in Urban Neighborhoods: 
A Multilevel Analysis of Victimization Risk, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 837, 837–64 (2001) [hereinafter 
Vélez, The Role of Public Social Control]; María B. Vélez, Toward an Understanding of the Lower 
Rates of Homicide in Latino Versus Black Neighborhoods: A Look at Chicago, in THE MANY 
COLORS OF CRIME: INEQUALITIES OF RACE, ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 91, 91–107 (Ruth 
D. Peterson et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Vélez, Homicide in Latino Versus Black Neighborhoods]. 
 67. E.g., SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 44, at 374–75; see Ramiro Martinez, Jr., Coming to 
America: The Impact of the New Immigration on Crime, in IMMIGRATION AND CRIME: RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENCE 1, 1–15 (Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Abel Valenzuela, Jr. eds., 2006) 
(providing a summary of this perspective). 
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community residents to organize to solve common problems.  Yet, recent 
studies challenge this contention in that they demonstrate consistently 
lower rates of violent crime in communities with more immigrants.68  
The exact mechanisms that account for this relationship are not fully 
understood.  However, Martinez argues that Latino and immigrant 
communities evidence relatively high levels of labor market attachment 
(albeit employment in menial jobs), a factor that should reduce 
involvement in violence.69  In addition, neighborhoods with more 
immigrants may exhibit less violent crime because large portions of the 
population use communities of origin as frames of reference in 
evaluating their circumstances.70  As deprived as conditions may be in 
U.S. barrios and other immigrant areas, conditions may be even worse in 
residents’ countries of origin, thus nullifying potential higher levels of 
violence that stem from reactions to ascriptive inequality in a purportedly 
open society.71 
A large body of research has evaluated the role of structural 
community conditions in accounting for variation in rates of violent 
crime.72  This research has shown clear links between the factors 
described above and neighborhood violence.73  However, little of this 
work has explored the connections of glaring divisions in community 
conditions with differences in violence across communities of distinct 
                                                          
 68. E.g., Vélez, Homicide in Latino Versus Black Neighborhoods, supra note 66, at 95.  See 
generally RAMIRO MARTINEZ, JR., LATINO HOMICIDE: IMMIGRATION, VIOLENCE AND COMMUNITY 
(2002); Matthew T. Lee et al., Does Immigration Increase Homicide?  Negative Evidence From 
Three Border Cities, 42 SOC. Q. 559 (2001); Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration, 
7 CONTEXTS 28 (2008). 
 69. MARTINEZ, supra note 68, at 6 (“Latinos have lower homicide rates than expected . . . 
because they exhibit higher levels of social integration, as measured by labor market involvement, 
while simultaneously exhibiting elevated poverty rates.  Latinos, heavily immigrant, are poor but 
working, and that influence shapes homicide.”); see also Vélez, Homicide in Latino Versus Black 
Neighborhoods, supra note 66, at 96. 
 70. MARTINEZ, supra note 68, at 133. 
 71. For statements concerning the effect of ascriptive inequality on violence, see generally 
STEVEN F. MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (3rd ed. 2001) 
and Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent 
Crime, 47 AM. SOC. REV. 114, 114–29 (1982). 
 72. See generally SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 44; Browning et al., supra note 44; Krivo & 
Peterson, supra note 1; McNulty, supra note 1; Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Inequality, 
Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban  Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517 (2001); 
Sampson et al., supra note 44.  For reviews, see generally Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, 
Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME AND JUST. 
373 (2005) and Robert J. Sampson, Collective Efficacy Theory: Lessons Learned and Directions for 
Future Inquiry, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 
149. 
 73. See generally SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 44; Browning et al., supra note 44; Krivo & 
Peterson, supra note 1; McNulty, supra note 1; Morenoff et al., supra note 72; Sampson et al., supra 
note 44. 
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colors.74  Further, analysts have not assessed and interpreted patterns in 
terms of the deeply embedded histories of privilege and oppression that 
are major sources of the creation and recreation of differential violence.  
This is a fundamental problem in providing a sound explanation for 
ethnoracial inequality in criminal violence because the racialized reality 
of the neighborhood structures is not a matter of neutral happenstance.  
Indeed, this reality is intricately embedded within much broader forces of 
social organization that are structured by race and class.  Taking this as a 
core premise upon which we organize and interpret our analyses provides 
a more in-depth and meaningful understanding of racial disparities in 
violent crime than heretofore has been available. 
IV. DATA AND METHODS 
A. Data and Sample 
Given that communities of color are often very dissimilar in their 
existing social conditions because of the racialized structure of society, 
any influences of community context on violence are commonly 
conflated with unaccounted-for differences associated with racial 
composition.  Thus, it is difficult to evaluate whether ethnoracial 
inequality in neighborhood violence (or other outcomes) is a product of 
the highly divergent local conditions as we argue.  To deal with this 
problem, research must be designed so that neighborhoods that are 
ethnoracially distinct but relatively similar in socioeconomic and other 
conditions can be compared.  The difficulty in doing so is that there are 
few highly impoverished and otherwise disadvantaged white urban 
neighborhoods, particularly ones that are as disadvantaged as many black 
communities in the United States.75  At the same time, there are very few 
black neighborhoods that are as affluent and widely advantaged as is 
commonly the case among white areas.76 
We conducted the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS) to 
address this comparability problem by collecting neighborhood data for 
many cities across the country.  While any single city might have only 
one middle class black neighborhood and one highly disadvantaged 
                                                          
 74. The exceptions are Krivo & Peterson, supra note 1, and McNulty, supra note 1.  For a more 
extended discussion of this point, see generally Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, 
Macrostructural Analyses of Race, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime: Recent Lessons and New 
Directions for Research, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 331 (2005). 
 75. See, e.g., McNulty, supra note 1, at 468; Peterson & Krivo, supra note 74, at 333. 
 76. See sources cited supra note 75. 
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white neighborhood, by including local areas across a large number of 
cities, our study yields a sample that has a sufficient number of 
ethnoracially distinct but otherwise comparable neighborhoods for 
addressing the interlinkages of interest here.  The NNCS includes 
reported crime counts obtained directly from police departments, and 
social and demographic information from the U.S. Census and Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act data for all census tracts (N=9593) within a 
representative sample of ninety-one U.S. cities (central cities and 
suburbs) with populations over 100,000 for the year 2000.77  The cities in 
the sample include places in all regions of the country, those with 
declining and healthy economies, and cities that vary in their levels of 
racial residential segregation.  The sample is highly representative of 
large cities (populations of at least 100,000), with means for the crime 
rate, black-white residential segregation, poverty, and racial composition 
for the sample differing by at most ten percent from the population of 
places with over 100,000 residents. 
Our analysis is restricted to 8286 census tracts (i.e., neighborhoods) 
across eighty-seven cities for which complete information is available for 
the set of violent crimes analyzed here.  We distinguish among four 
ethnoracial neighborhood types: predominantly white, predominantly 
black, predominantly Latino, and integrated.  Neighborhoods are defined 
as predominantly white, black, or Latino if the respective group 
constitutes at least seventy percent of the tract population.  Whites and 
blacks include only those who are non-Latino and Latinos include those 
of any census racial category.78  Tracts are considered integrated when 
none of the three panethnic groups is larger than seventy percent of the 
population and when blacks and Latinos together do not make up more 
than seventy percent of the population.  The integrated tracts have much 
more of a balance of ethnoracial groups than the single group dominant 
tracts.79  The sample examined here includes 3115 white neighborhoods, 
                                                          
 77. We needed to collect data directly from police departments for the NNCS because the only 
existing central repository of crime in the United States is provided through the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program.  However, the UCR data are for entire 
agencies only, such as cities, counties, or other similar jurisdictions and do not include information 
for smaller area units (e.g., neighborhoods) within these jurisdictions. 
 78. In the U.S. Census, racial identification is obtained from a question that asks a person to 
select “one or more” of the categories listed on the census questionnaire.  Responses include: White; 
Black, African American or Negro; American Indian or Alaska Native; a range of specific Asian or 
Pacific Island origin groups; or Some Other Race.  Hispanic/Latino identification is obtained through 
a separate question that asks whether the person is Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.  Thus, Latino identified 
individuals can be of any census racial identification.  Census.gov, RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
CLASSIFICATIONS USED IN CENSUS 2000 AND BEYOND, http://www.census.gov/population/www/ 
socdemo/race/racefactcb.html. 
 79. Mixed minority neighborhoods where the combination of blacks and Latinos makes up 
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1467 black neighborhoods, 679 Latino neighborhoods, and 3025 
integrated neighborhoods. 
B. Variables and Operationalizations 
The operationalizations for all variables are presented in Table 1.  
The dependent variable is a three-year average count (1999–2001) of 
violent crimes (homicides and robberies) reported to the police.80  We 
use multi-year counts to minimize the impact of annual fluctuations for 
small units.  Substantively, we are interested in predicting rates of 
reported violent crime, and do this through the use of non-linear 
multilevel modeling.81  Neighborhood characteristics include residential 
instability, residential loans, immigration, and socioeconomic 
disadvantage.  Residential instability is measured with an index (average 
z-scores) combining the percent of renter-occupied units and the percent 
of residents aged five or older who lived in a different dwelling in 1995 
(α=.69).  Residential loans are measured as the total dollar amount (in 
$1000) of home mortgages originated in the census tract in 2000 (logged 
due to skewness).  They include conventional, Federal Housing 
Administration, and Veterans Administration loans for single or multi-
family home purchases, home improvements, or refinancing.  Immigrant 
prevalence is represented by an index (average z-scores) comprised of 
three variables: the percent of the total population that is foreign born, 
the percent of the total population that is foreign born and arrived in the 
U.S. in 1990 or later, and the percent of households in which no one age 
fourteen and over speaks English well (α=.96).  Disadvantage is an index 
(average z-scores) of the extent of joblessness, professional or 
managerial occupations (reverse coded), high school graduates (reverse 
coded), female-headed families, secondary sector workers (those in the 
six occupations with the lowest average incomes),82 and poverty (α=.93).  
                                                                                                                       
 
 
seventy percent or more of the population (but neither group alone is more than seventy percent) are 
excluded. 
 80. Aggravated assaults are not included because the data obtained from police departments for 
this crime are missing for a substantial number of places due to problems of poor data quality. 
 81. See infra Part IV.C. 
 82. The lowest wage occupations were determined based upon mean national wage data by 
occupation for the thirty-three occupational categories for which such data are available for tracts.  
The national wage data were derived from 2000 census information obtained from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series.  See generally DANIEL H. WEINBERG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000 ABOUT EARNINGS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION FOR MEN AND 
WOMEN 6 (2004), http://usa.ipums.org/use/voliii/pubdocs/2000/censr-15.pdf.  The six occupations 
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We include the percent of residents who are male and between fifteen 
and thirty-four years old to control for the crime-prone population. 
 
Table 1: Operationalizations, Means, and Standard Deviations of 
Variables 
Variables Operationalizations 
Dependent Variable  
Violent Crimes Three year (1999–2001) average number of homicides and 
robberies per 1000 tract population 
Independent Variables  
Tract Level (N=8286)  
Nghd. Race/Ethnic Comp. Dummy variables for type of area: 
      White Nghd., 1=70% or more non-Hispanic white      
     (else=0) 
      Black Nghd., 1=70% or more non-Hispanic black  
     (else=0) 
      Latino Nghd., 1=70% or more Hispanic (else=0) 
      Integrated Nghd., 1=Any other race/ethnic  
     combination (else=0) 
Residential Instability 
("=.69) 
Average of the standard scores for two variables: 
      % of occupied housing units that are renter- 
     occupied 
      % of population age 5 and over who lived in a  
     different residence in 1995 
Residential Loans Total dollar amount of loans originated (in $1000) 
Immigrant Prevalence 
("=.96) 
Average of the standard scores of the following three variables: 
      % of the total population that is foreign born 
      % of the total population that is foreign born and  
     arrived in the U.S. in 1990 or later 
      % of households in which no one age 14 and over  
     speaks English well 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
included are: food preparation and serving-related occupations; personal care and service 
occupations; farming, fishing, and forestry occupations; building and grounds cleaning and 
maintenance occupations; health care support occupations; and material moving workers.  This 
group of occupations is similar to that included in indicators of secondary sector work used in 
studies of labor stratification and violent crime.  See, e.g., Robert D. Crutchfield et al., A Tale of 
Three Cities: Labor Markets and Homicide, 32 SOC. FOCUS 65, 69 (1999); Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth 
D. Peterson, Labor Market Conditions and Violent Crime Among Youth and Adults, 47 SOC. PERSP. 
485, 492 (2004). 
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Disadvantage ("=.93) Average of the standard scores for six variables: 
      % of population 16–64 who are unemployed or out  
     of the labor force (joblessness) 
      % of employed civilian population age 16 and over  
     working in professional or managerial occupations  
     (reverse coded in index) 
      % of population age 25 and over who are college  
     graduates (reverse coded in index) 
      % of households that are female-headed families 
      % of employed civilian population age 16 and over  
     employed in the six occupational categories with  
     the lowest average incomes 
      % of population that is below the poverty line 
Percent of Males 15–34 Percent of the population that is male age 15–34 
Independent Variables  
City Level (N=87)  
Segregation Index of Dissimilarity across census tracts within the city between 
non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks 
Disadvantage ("=.94) Average of the standard scores for six variables: 
      % of population 16–64 who are unemployed or out  
     of the labor force (joblessness) 
      % of employed civilian population age 16 and over  
     working in professional or managerial occupations  
     (reverse coded in index) 
      % of population age 25 and over who are college  
     graduates (reverse coded in index) 
      % of households that are female-headed families 
      % of employed civilian population age 16 and over  
     employed in the six occupational categories with  
     the lowest average incomes 
      % of population that is below the poverty line 
Manufacturing Jobs Percent of employed civilian population age 16 and over working in 
a manufacturing industry 
Population Total city population 
Percent Black Percent of the city population that is non-Hispanic black 
Percent Movers Percent of the population age 5 and over who lived in a different 
residence in 1995 
Percent Foreign Born Percent of the population that is foreign born 
Percent Young Males Percent of the population that is male age 15–34 
South Dummy for 1 if South (0 if else) 
West Dummy for 1 if West (0 if else) 
 
In multivariate models, characteristics of cities in which the census 
tracts are located are also controlled: black-white residential segregation, 
city disadvantage (measured in a parallel fashion to the neighborhood 
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indicator), percent manufacturing jobs, population size, percent non-
Latino black, percent of recent movers, percent foreign born, percent 
young males, and region.  Racial residential segregation is measured with 
the widely used Black-White Index of Dissimilarity (D) for census tracts 
within the city.83  D measures the extent of deviation from evenness of 
blacks and whites across areas within the city.  It ranges from zero to one 
hundred with values representing the percent of blacks (or whites) who 
would have to change their tract of residence to achieve perfect 
integration.  For example, in Chicago (the most segregated city in our 
sample), the Index of Dissimilarity is 85.2, indicating that just over 85% 
of blacks (or whites) in this city would have to move to a different 
neighborhood for Chicago to become completely integrated. 
C. Methods of Analysis 
The analysis proceeds in several stages.  We begin by describing the 
extent of residential separation of whites, blacks, and Latinos in the 
places studied here.  Next, we examine patterns of differentiation in 
neighborhood conditions and violent crime across the four ethnoracial 
neighborhood types.  Finally, we explore the net contribution of 
neighborhood social conditions in accounting for ethnoracial inequality 
in neighborhood violent crime using multivariate models that control for 
neighborhood age-sex composition and the relevant city violence 
predictors noted above.  In particular, we estimate multilevel models 
with tracts as level-one units and cities as level-two units (representing 
tracts as cases that are embedded within cities as contexts).  Because we 
are analyzing relatively rare events within small units, we estimate a non-
linear Poisson model (with overdispersion) with counts of violent crime 
as the outcome.  We specify that these counts have variable exposure by  
 
                                                          
 83. These data were acquired from the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and 
Regional Research. 
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tract population, and thereby make the analysis one of violence rates.84  
All continuous variables are grand-mean centered. 
V. RESULTS 
A. Divergent Social Worlds 
The data from the NNCS demonstrate clearly the strong connections 
that exist between race-ethnicity and residential location in the urban 
United States.  Indeed, these links are strong enough that ethnoracial 
groups in U.S. cities can be described as living in “divergent social 
worlds.”  Neighborhoods in which whites and blacks live are especially 
homogeneous.  Figure 1 presents the percentages of white, black, and 
Latino individuals in the eighty-seven cities studied here who live in 
predominantly white, black, Latino, and integrated areas.  Over sixty 
percent of whites in these large cities reside in communities in which 
their neighbors are mainly (seventy percent) other whites.  Fifty-eight 
percent of blacks reside in areas where the vast majority of residents are 
black.  A smaller but still sizable portion of Latinos (thirty-nine percent) 
have predominantly Latino neighbors.  These racially distinct 
concentrations are the case even though only half of all residents of these 
cities are white, and about forty percent are either black (21.2%) or 
Latino (20.8%). 
 
                                                          
 84. We use HLM 6.04 to fit our multi-level models.  In non-linear Poisson models in HLM, the 
specification that crime counts have variable exposure by tract population is equivalent to specifying 
a Poisson model in which tract population is included as an independent variable with its parameter 
fixed at 1.  A common concern in the application of the Poisson model is that it assumes equal mean 
and variance of the dependent variable.  However, in the case of rare count events like those 
analyzed here, this assumption is frequently violated with the variance being considerably larger 
than the mean, i.e., there is overdispersion.  See, e.g., D. Wayne Osgood, Poisson-Based Regression 
Analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates, 16 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 21, 28 (2000) (discussing 
overdispersion and offering solution using Poisson regression).  In our analyses, we tested for 
overdispersion and found that it is significant.  Hence, we control for overdispersion in the level-one 
variance.  In hierarchical linear models, a Poisson model with overdispersion is analogous to a 
negative binomial model. 
7.0 PETERSON FINAL 4/21/2009  9:50:40 AM 
922 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
Figure 1:  Percentage of Ethnoracial Groups Living in Predominantly 




























Residential separation is most dramatic for whites for whom only a 
trivial proportion live in areas with substantial numbers of either blacks 
(one percent) or Latinos (two percent).  Still, blacks and Latinos also 
experience substantial separation from other groups with just ten percent 
of blacks and thirteen percent of Latinos living in neighborhoods with a 
large representation of either of the other two groups.  Although 
neighborhood ethnoracial segregation is the norm for whites and for 
blacks, notable portions of all three groups do live in integrated 
neighborhood contexts in 2000.  About one-third of whites and blacks 
and nearly half of Latinos reside in such areas. 
While Figure 1 clearly shows stark ethnoracial residential separation 
alongside some tendency for groups to mix, it obscures the extreme 
isolation that exists for blacks compared to the other groups.  Blacks are 
uniquely hypersegregated in the United States.85  To explore how this 
pattern is reflected in the data for the eighty-seven cities considered here, 
Figure 2 presents the percentage of each of the three ethnoracial groups 
that lives in neighborhoods that are comprised almost completely (≥ 
ninety percent) of residents from the same group.  This figure shows that 
a full thirty-nine percent of urban blacks in our sample live in 
neighborhoods that are almost exclusively comprised of other blacks.   
 
                                                          
 85. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 74–77; Wilkes & Iceland, supra note 27, at 23–
26.  See generally Nancy A. Denton, Are African Americans Still Hypersegregated?, in 
RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 49, 49–81 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994). 
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This compares with just fourteen percent of whites and eleven percent of 
Latinos who live in areas with over ninety percent of their own group. 
 
Figure 2:  Percentage of Ethnoracial Groups Living in Neighborhoods 
















B. Ethnoracial Neighborhood Inequality 
The residential separation of groups across neighborhoods is 
significant because the consequences are not neutral; that is, separate still 
is far from equal.  In fact, white neighborhoods are highly advantaged 
and black and Latino neighborhoods are disadvantaged in a variety of 
ways.  Figures 3 and 4 show how this inequality is reflected in the NNCS 
data for nearly 8300 neighborhoods across eighty-seven cities.  Figure 3 
reports the distribution of levels of neighborhood poverty for all white, 
black, Latino, and integrated neighborhoods.  In this graph, low poverty 
neighborhoods are defined as those with twenty percent or fewer of 
residents below the poverty line; high poverty refers to areas where 
between twenty and forty percent of the population is in poverty; and 
extreme poverty neighborhoods have rates of forty percent or more.  
Overall, these data reveal striking differences across the ethnoracial 
neighborhood types. 
Indeed, there is very little overlap in levels of poverty across areas of 
different ethnoracial compositions, with the differences being most 
extreme between blacks and whites. 
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White urban neighborhoods are almost exclusively low poverty, with 
ninety-three percent falling in this category—only six percent have high 
poverty and a mere one percent are extremely impoverished.  The 
difference in this distribution from that found among black 
neighborhoods is stark.  Less than one-quarter of black neighborhoods 
have low levels of poverty while more than half (fifty-three percent) are 
high poverty areas.  A full one-quarter of black neighborhoods are 
characterized by extreme levels of poverty.  The neighborhood poverty 
distribution for Latino neighborhoods is quite similar to that for black 
areas; twenty-two percent have low poverty while sixty-two percent and 
sixteen percent have high and extreme poverty, respectively.  Reflecting 
the mixture of populations, integrated neighborhoods fall between those 
for whites and the other two ethnoracial groups. 
Figure 4 presents data comparing white and black areas in terms of 
the disadvantage index.  Recall that this index summarizes where 
neighborhoods fall simultaneously across a set of socioeconomic 
neighborhood conditions.86  We present these data because neither 
poverty nor any other single characteristic stands alone in the real 
communities in which people live.  Rather, a variety of adverse or 
favorable circumstances tend to coexist, forming constellations of 
disadvantage or advantage that comprise the contexts of people’s lived 
communities.  With the disadvantage index, a value of zero is average, 
                                                          
 86. See supra Table 1. 
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positive values reflect ever greater levels of disadvantage, and values 
below zero show the inverse (i.e., more advantage). 
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These data show that inequality between black and white 
neighborhoods is even more striking for overall disadvantage than for 
poverty alone.  On the one hand, most white neighborhoods have below 
average disadvantage, with many having very low levels.  On the other 
hand, virtually all of the black neighborhoods have above average 
disadvantage with a full thirty percent at the most extreme level of the 
disadvantage distribution.  As a whole, the graph has a decidedly v-
shaped appearance because most white or black neighborhoods fall in the 
extremes of advantage/disadvantage rather than near the average.  
Indeed, very few neighborhoods, whether white or black, have levels of 
disadvantage that are near zero, making the notion of “average” 
disadvantage a misnomer.  Rather, there are two distributions in which 
the “average” white and “average” black neighborhoods are nearly 
completely distinct from one another in their socioeconomic character—
white neighborhoods being highly advantaged and black neighborhoods 
being heavily disadvantaged.  Although not reported here, patterns for 
Latino compared to white neighborhoods are similar, but less extremely 
differentiated than the black-white comparison.  The distribution of  
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disadvantage for integrated neighborhoods appears to be a combination 
of the white and two predominantly non-white types of areas.87 
Turning to inequality in violent crime across the ethnoracially 
distinct neighborhood types, Figure 5 shows patterns that, to some 
degree, correspond with the variation in socioeconomic conditions.  
Average violent crime rates are dramatically higher in neighborhoods of 
color than in white neighborhoods.88  The rate in white neighborhoods 
per thousand population is approximately two.  The mean violence rate 
for black neighborhoods is five times higher at ten per thousand.  The 
mean rates for Latino and integrated areas are nearly two and a half times 
that for white neighborhoods at just under five per thousand.  The 
question addressed in the following section is whether these patterns hold 
when the full set of neighborhood and city characteristics that are 
associated with violent crime rates are taken into account. 
 
























                                                          
 87. Other community characteristics are also highly variable across the ethnoracial 
neighborhood types.  The patterns for these factors generally fall in line with those for disadvantage.  
Descriptive statistics for all of the community conditions included here by race-ethnicity of 
neighborhood are provided in Appendix A. 
 88. The violent crime rate is defined as the number of murders and robberies in the census tract 
per thousand population in the tract. 
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C. Evaluating the Links Between Violent Crime and Racialized 
Community Structure 
As noted above, we utilize statistical models that simultaneously take 
into account a variety of factors that are theoretically related to 
neighborhood violent crime and explore their contributions to differences 
in rates between white areas and black, Latino, and integrated 
neighborhoods.  Table 2 presents the results from these models.  In 
particular, the values in this table represent the ratio of the neighborhood 
violent crime rate in the average black, Latino, or integrated area to that 
in the average white area.  The first row of values shows these ratios 
when controlling for neighborhood age-sex structure and city 
characteristics alone.  Each row successively adds one of the theoretical 
neighborhood factors that is considered to be a major contributor to local 
violence.  As discussed above, these factors are also racially structured 
across urban neighborhoods in the United States.  To the degree that 
racialized social conditions contribute to ethnoracial inequality in violent 
crime, we anticipate that the reported violence ratios will fall closer to 
one as each additional neighborhood factor is taken into account. 
 
 
Table 2:  Ratios of Violent Crime Rates for Black, Latino, and Integrated 









1. Control Factors 4.29 2.48 2.24 
2. Residential Instability 3.81 2.45 2.00 
3. Residential Loans 3.28 2.13 1.90 
4. Immigration 3.27 2.20 1.92 
5. Disadvantage 1.78 1.39 1.47 
 
In an average city, violent crime in black neighborhoods is just over 
four and a quarter times that in white neighborhoods (control model, row 
1).  Violent crime in Latino areas is about two and a half times the rate in 
the average white neighborhood, while integrated areas have about two 
and a quarter the average white rate.  When levels of residential 
instability are taken into account, the excess of violent crime in black and 
                                                          
 89. All results control for neighborhood age structure and city racial residential segregation 
disadvantage, manufacturing jobs, population size, percent non-Latino black, percent of recent 
movers, percent foreign born, percent young males, and region. 
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integrated compared to white neighborhoods is reduced only modestly 
(from 4.29 to 3.81 for the former and from 2.24 to 2.00 for the latter); the 
Latino-white difference in violence is unaffected.  For each type of 
neighborhood, external investments, as reflected in greater residential 
loans, reduce the differentials further (comparing rows 2 and 3), with this 
change being more substantial for black and Latino than for integrated 
areas.  Immigration is not a powerful part of the story in accounting for 
inequality in crime across distinct ethnoracial areas.  The difference in 
average violence rates for each of the non-white compared to white 
neighborhoods is very similar before and after immigration is controlled 
for (comparing rows 3 and 4).  Among the structural factors, 
disadvantage is the major condition that accounts for the much higher 
levels of violence evidenced in all types of non-white neighborhoods 
(comparing rows 4 and 5).  Including disadvantage reduces the black-
white ratio by about half.  The reduction approaches forty percent for the 
Latino-white ratio, and is approximately one-quarter for the integrated-
white neighborhood comparison. 
Clearly, racialized neighborhood structural factors go a long way in 
accounting for inequality in levels of violent crime across areas with 
distinct ethnoracial compositions.  If dramatic differences in social 
circumstances by race did not exist in the United States, our data suggest 
that black neighborhoods would have rates of violence that are, on 
average, only seventy-eight percent higher than in white neighborhoods, 
not three hundred twenty-nine percent higher ([4.29 - 1.00] × 100).  
Latino and integrated neighborhoods would have rates that are, 
respectively, just thirty-nine and forty-seven percent higher than in white 
areas, not more than twice as high (as shown in row 1).  Despite such 
large reductions, racial privilege in violent crime rates for white 
communities still exists and is highly consequential. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
White neighborhoods that are relatively free from violence, black 
neighborhoods that are steeped in violent crime, and communities of 
other colors that fall in between on the spectrum of violence provide a 
poignant picture of urban areas in the United States.  In this Article, we 
sought to articulate and empirically explore how this dramatic pattern of 
inequality in one visible aspect of the urban experience is intricately 
interconnected with the ways in which the structure of U.S. society is 
broadly racialized.  We contend that the privilege of low levels of 
violence in white communities versus the peril of oppressively high 
levels of violence in black (and to some degree other) neighborhoods is 
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not a product of individual differences in tendencies toward violence.  
Rather, these inequalities are outgrowths of structural arrangements that 
favor whites and subordinate other racial groups, especially blacks.  
Racial residential segregation is one such arrangement.  In particular, 
segregation serves to reinforce and maintain the racial hierarchy by 
allowing for ethnoracially differentiated opportunities, rewards, and 
contexts for action at the neighborhood level.  To the degree that 
ethnoracial groups are exposed to fundamentally different local contexts, 
inequalities in violence (and a host of other outcomes) result.  Thus, the 
intricate interconnections among race, place, and community conditions 
found in the United States are critical to understanding the sources of 
race-ethnic differentials in neighborhood violent crime. 
Our empirical findings are highly consistent with this perspective.  
Drawing on data from the NNCS, we showed that whites and non-whites 
live in separate residential spaces.  The isolation is particularly 
pronounced for blacks for whom nearly forty percent live in places 
where at least ninety percent of residents are other blacks.  The data also 
demonstrate that these separate residential spaces represent separate 
social worlds; white local environments are far more stable, 
socioeconomically advantaged, and imbued with external resources (i.e., 
residential loans) than black or Latino neighborhoods.  Indeed, in urban 
areas, the distributions of the most central social condition (i.e., 
disadvantage) are so disparate across ethnoracial groups that levels for 
white areas barely overlap with those for non-white neighborhoods.  
Such differences in the characteristics of neighborhoods go a long way in 
accounting for the vastly different levels of violent crime observed in our 
data.  Notably, gross rates of violence are two and a half to five times 
greater in the three types of non-white neighborhoods than in white areas 
(Figure 5), but these differences drop to a maximum of one and three 
quarters after critical community conditions are taken into account 
(Table 2). 
What are the implications of the racialization perspective we have 
described, and our striking empirical results, for reducing or eradicating 
ethnoracial inequality in violent crime patterns?  The fundamental 
answer is in altering the racialized structure that we have pointed to as 
undergirding the observed racial disparities.  However, it is unlikely that 
such dramatic social change will be brought about in the short run.  Thus, 
alternative solutions that help to alleviate the undue burdens of excessive 
violence and other serious social problems that some groups confront are 
needed.  Analysts and policymakers could seek approaches to rectify the 
extraordinary differences in community conditions across neighborhoods 
of distinct colors.  This would involve imbuing non-white areas of cities 
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with critical resources to: help alleviate poverty and joblessness; improve 
educational systems; fix and upgrade the physical infrastructure of 
housing, businesses, and public facilities; increase homeownership and 
the value of housing; contribute to family stability; bring jobs and 
services to areas; and generally increase community well-being.  A 
system of community reparations might be a strategy for building more 
equitable residential environments between white areas and communities 
of other colors.  This system would distribute dollars, know-how, and 
programs not to individuals but to neighborhoods that suffer from the 
long-term historical consequences of a racialized society that harkens 
back to Jim Crow, slavery, and beyond. 
Another approach might be to loosen the links among race, place, 
and social conditions by “the equalization of opportunities through 
regional strategies.”90  With a regional strategy, the metropolitan area is 
treated as an organic whole, relying upon a regional authority to 
distribute resources and services.91  Accordingly, all groups and locations 
within the metropolitan area are served by the same institutional entities 
in areas such as housing, zoning, employment, education, public 
transportation, and policies with respect to businesses.  As such, the 
benefits and pitfalls flowing from these regional authorities would be 
similar for all metropolitan residents (and organizations).  In this way, a 
regionalism approach should lead to more racially equitable social 
conditions and, in turn, to lower and more equitable levels of local 
violence. 
While the above suggestions would likely be helpful for non-white 
areas, their impact in reducing racial disparities in violence (and other 
undesirable outcomes) would be limited by the persistence of the 
racialized spatial and social order that is the fundamental basis of the 
inequality.  As noted earlier, the organization of society overall, and the 
housing market in particular, means that whites have considerable 
freedom to live and move where they choose.92  This privilege of 
                                                          
 90. john a. powell, Structural Racism and Spatial Jim Crow, in THE BLACK METROPOLIS IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS OF PLACE, supra note 35, at 54. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally Kyle Crowder & Scott J. South, Race, Class, and Changing Patterns of 
Migration Between Poor and Nonpoor Neighborhoods, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1715 (2005) (discussing 
how race remains a salient factor in determining the likelihood of exiting or entering poor 
neighborhoods); Emily Rosenbaum & Samantha Friedman, Differences in the Locational Attainment 
of Immigrant and Native-Born Households with Children in New York City, 38 DEMOGRAPHY, Aug. 
2001, at 337 (showing that immigrant households with children live in neighborhoods of lower 
quality); Scott J. South et al., Exiting and Entering High-Poverty Neighborhoods: Latinos, Blacks, 
and Anglos Compared, 84 SOC. FORCES 873 (2005) (showing that blacks exhibit by far the highest 
rates of moving into high-poverty neighborhoods); Scott J. South et al., Inter-Neighborhood 
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whiteness, coupled with market discrimination and racist attitudes, yields 
heavily segregated white areas that are distant from the most challenging 
environments that increase violence.93  This isolation and distance is its 
own reward because whites obtain the substantial benefits of living in 
neighborhoods and suburban communities that are the safest and most 
resource rich environments.94  When whites are geographically isolated 
from other groups, they also have little vested interest in addressing the 
underlying structural problems associated with criminal violence.95  
Therefore, fundamental and lasting reductions in the unequal distribution 
of violence will only be achieved by dismantling residential 
arrangements whereby whites reap undue gains at the expense of 
neighborhoods of color.  This reality poses major concerns regarding 
community reparations and regional government as strategies for 
reducing ethnoracial disparities in violence.  The former infuses new 
resources into neglected minority communities, but changes none of the 
conditions that allow whites to gain substantially by separating 
themselves from other groups.  The regional approach aims to address 
the consequences of residential arrangements by bringing all parts of the 
metropolis into single service delivery and regulatory systems.  
                                                                                                                       
 
 
Migration and Spatial Assimilation in a Multi-Ethnic World: Comparing Latinos, Blacks and 
Anglos, 87 SOC. FORCES 415 (2008) (discussing the spatial assimilation theory and migration into 
neighborhoods of varying racial and ethnic composition). 
 93. See, e.g., Morenoff et al., supra note 72 (“Spatial dynamics coupled with neighborhood 
inequalities in social and economic capacity are therefore consequential for explaining urban 
violence.”). 
 94. See, e.g., id. at 552 (noting that increased concentration of affluence “has yielded important 
consequences for the distribution of homicide”). 
 95. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 158–60 (“[T]he ‘chocolate city-vanilla 
suburb’ pattern . . . gives white politicians a strong interest in limiting the flow of public resources to 
black-controlled cities.”); Lauren J. Krivo et al., Segregation, Racial Structure, and Neighborhood 
Violent Crime, 114 AM. J. SOC. (forthcoming May 2009).  At the same time, there is some evidence 
that within select areas of even highly segregated cities citizens are able to organize to successfully 
fight crime, drugs, and other social problems when the neighborhoods are racially and ethnically 
diverse.  For example, evidence shows that in one racially and economically diverse neighborhood in 
Dayton, Ohio, residents responded to serious local problems through mobilization efforts that 
encouraged citizen involvement and government investments in ways that stabilized the area and 
improved local conditions.  See Patrick G. Donnelly & Charles Kimble, Community Organizing, 
Environmental Change, and Neighborhood Crime, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 493, 508 (1997) (discussing 
mobilization efforts that led to crime reduction); Patrick G. Donnelly & Theo J. Majka, Residents’ 
Efforts at Neighborhood Stabilization: Facing the Challenges of Inner-City Neighborhoods, 13 SOC. 
FORUM 189, 209–11 (1998).  These efforts were facilitated by a unique city-wide structure for 
citizen participation that supports groups working together.  Similarly, the Dudley Street 
neighborhood in Boston offers another example of the possibility for cross-group organizing to 
successfully fight urban deterioration within a context of city-wide segregation.  See PETER MEDOFF 
& HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 175–79 
(1994) (discussing agency collaboration to provide social services). 
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However, this leaves in place racial and class segregation, the social 
processes that maintain such segregation, and various market and other 
mechanisms by which benefits flow to existing white and other high 
status areas.  Thus, neither of these alternatives would change the fact 
that white areas would still be far ahead of those for other racial groups 
in reaping benefits in arenas such as housing value and wealth 
accumulation, the attraction of favorable institutions, and the formation 
of informal organizations that support communities. 
Race scholars are well aware that policies and programs that attempt 
to reduce or eliminate racial disparities in violence and many other 
outcomes that are implemented within the current social organization of 
society can only yield limited piecemeal change.  As such, they call for 
more systemic social and activist strategies to challenge white privilege 
and the status quo.96  In other words, they argue for a new and militant 
civil rights movement that demands equality and refuses to accept 
second-class citizenship for blacks and other people of color.  This new 
social movement also includes a role for social scientists.97  In particular, 
race scholars articulate a need for researchers to demythify and 
deracialize ideologies (e.g., color-blindness, abstract liberalism), policies, 
and practices that support systems of racial stratification.98  While our 
work is not a specific response to this call, it provides a concerted 
attempt to expose the ways in which the underlying racial order 
perpetuates racial disparities in violence.  In so doing, we make clear that 
progress in eliminating these disparities, as well as others that plague 
urban areas, will occur only when we attack the broad-based racialized 
structure of U.S. society. 
 
                                                          
 96. See, e.g., BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 2; BONILLA-SILVA, 
WHITE SUPREMACY, supra note 2, at 198–204 (discussing activist strategies to change the “racial 
status quo”); Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Telling the Real Tale of the Hunt: Toward a 
Race Conscious Sociology of Racial Stratification, in WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND 
METHODOLOGY 329, 335–39 (Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008) (arguing for 
social scientists to “do whatever they can to be active in the various social movements against white 
supremacy”).  See generally Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & Tukufu Zuberi, Toward a Definition of White 
Logic and White Methods, in WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY, supra, 
at 3–27 (discussing how white research methods can reinforce the status quo). 
 97. See sources cited supra note 95.  For further readings regarding assessments of current 
scientific approaches and recommendations for new approaches to conducting research in racialized 
fields and building “racial knowledge,” see generally RACING RESEARCH, RESEARCHING RACE: 
METHODOLOGICAL DILEMMAS IN CRITICAL RACE STUDIES (France Winddance Twine & Jonathan 
W. Warren eds., 2000); WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY, supra note 
96. 
 98. See sources cited supra notes 95–96. 
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APPENDIX A. MEANS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN 











Residential Instability -.23 -.21 .20 .30 
 Percent Renters 36.1 55.2 60.8 54.4 
 Percent Movers 51.6 41.4 49.8 56.3 
Residential Loans 22,073 4919 6485 14,003 
Immigration -.41 -.67 1.99 .31 
 Percent Foreign Born 8.8 2.8 47.9 21.3 
 Recent Immigrants 3.7 1.3 21.5 10.2 
 Linguistically 
       Isolated 
2.4 1.3 31.6 9.4 
Disadvantage -.67 1.03 .83 .00 
 Joblessness 23.5 47.8 47.1 32.4 
 Professional  
       Workers 
44.2 21.2 13.1 31.6 
 College Graduates 39.8 9.9 6.7 24.4 
 Female-Headed 
       Families 
8.6 35.7 18.6 14.7 
 Low Wage Jobs 12.2 26.3 25.1 18.4 
 Poverty 8.6 31.7 28.9 17.9 
 
                                                          
 99. See Table 1 for the definitions of all variables.  
